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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
COREYMAISEY : Case No. 20030218-C A 
Defendant/ Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of one count of Disarming a Police 
Officer, a first-degree felony in violation of U.C.A.§ 76-5-102.8 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF 
THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, 
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION WHEN HIS ATTORNEY FAILED MAKE A 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED 
AFTER AN ILLEGAL SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Appellate Court must determine as a 
matter of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to effective 
assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 
(1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated a two part test, which was 
1 
adopted in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine whether 
counsel was ineffective. The Court held that; 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. 
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 
not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's 
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable. 
Id. at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
POINTII 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN 
FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD 
BEEN ILLEGALLY SEIZED BY THE POLICE? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was not properly preserved for 
appeal(R. 146/), therefore the plain error standard applies. "To establish plain 
error, a defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the error should 
have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful. State v. Bradley, 
2002 UT App 348 (See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct.App. 
1992) and State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993). 
POINT III 
WAS THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED AFTER THE DEFENDANT < 
WAS ILLEGALLY SEIZED FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS 




STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was not fully and properly preserved 
for appeal, and therefore the plain error standard applies. "To establish plain error, 
a defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful. State v. Bradley, 2002 
UT App 348 (See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) 
and State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993). 
POINTIV 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
RULING TO ALLOW TESTIMONY OF THE DEFENDANT'S 
PRISON RECORD AND PAROLE STATUS? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was preserved for appeal when a 
motion was made, argued, and ruled on during trial by the trial court on the 9th day 
of April 2001. (R 146/pgs. 210-219). This Court reviews this issue with a standard 
of "abuse of discretion", however, "admission of prior crimes evidence itself must 
be scrupulously examined by trial judges in the proper exercise of that discretion". 
State v. Decorso, 993 P.2d 837,843 (Utah 1999). Decorso requires the trial court to 
apply a two-prong analysis. First, the trial court must determine whether the 
evidence is being offered for a proper noncharacter purpose. Second, the trial 
court must determine whether the evidence tends to prove some fact material to the 
crime charged, and whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice. 
3 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Sixth Amendment 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, 
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence. 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article 1, Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Article 1, Section 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
4 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted 
by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance 
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§76-5-102.8. Disarming a peace officer. A person is guilty of a first degree felony 
who intentionally takes or removes, or attempts to take or remove, a firearm from 
the person or immediate presence of a person he knows is a peace officer: (2) while 
the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
RULE 402. RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE; 
IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE. 
Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or 
by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is 
not relevant is not admissible. 
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF 
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE 
CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES 
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait 
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
5 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered 
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the 
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, 
or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first 
aggressor; 
(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as 
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is 
admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the requirements 
ofRules402and403. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant is charged in a single count information dated September 18, 
2000 with the offense of Disarming a Police Officer, a first-degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.8. On October 19, 2000 the Defendant 
made an initial appearance and the information was read. On October 26, 2000, the 
defendant was present at his preliminary hearing. After witnesses were called and 
examined, the court found probable cause to bind the matter over for trial, and the 
matter was set for trial for February 5 and 6, 2001. The defense moved to continue 
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the trial and a jury trial was held on April 9 and 10 2001 with the Honorable 
Judge Michael D. Lyon presiding. 
After a two-day jury trial, held April 9 and 10 2001 the jury returned with 
a guilty verdict, and on April 10, 2001 the defendant was sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of five years to life in the Utah State Prison. The Judgment, 
Sentencing and Commitment was filed on May 8, 2001. The prison term was 
commenced on April 10, 2001. 
A Nunc Pro Tunc judgment and conviction was entered on February 24, 
2003 extending the defendant's time to file an appeal for 30 days. The defendant 
filed his notice of appeal on March 11, 2003 and an amended notice of appeal was 
filed on April 24, 2003. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Defendant was charged in a single count information dated September 
18, 2000 with the offense of Disarming a Police Officer, a first-degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.8. At trial the prosecutor elicited 
testimony from Agent Chad Barnett of the Weber/Morgan Narcotics Strike Force. 
He testified that he was following up on a tip of marijuana sales in a home in South 
Ogden. He was conducting a knock-and-talk at that home that day. (R. 146/58) 
Agent Barnett was working that day in plain clothes (R. 146/81) and was wearing 
his badge underneath his clothing (R. 146/63). After talking to some individuals at 
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the home, and gaining entrance to the home he then took the badge out. (R. 
146/63) The officer talked to an individual named Danny and observed some drugs 
and paraphernalia in his pockets. (R. 146/ 64) The officer then ascertained that 
there was another individual in the home, and the other occupants called for the 
defendant to come out. (R. 146/65) Agent Jensen testified that he did not feel 
threatened at that time, as the individuals on the porch "were very respectful and 
very calm". (R. 146/ 148) Officer Barnett asked Danny if he could go into the 
home to get the defendant and Danny hesitated. (R. 146/ 66) The officer then 
threatened to get a search warrant, and Danny offered to go get the defendant. (R. 
146/ 66) The officer said, "no, by all means you are not going in alone." (R. 146/ 
66) The officer then entered the home and began a search of the premises. After 
searching the home for some time, Danny turned to walk out of the home and said 
"there's nobody down here, let's go." (R. 146/ 69) The officer again asserted his 
authority saying, "no, we need to check all the areas." (R. 146/ 69) The officer 
looked around some more and finally saw the reflection of the defendant in a 
mirror in the bathroom. He identified himself as a police officer and asked the 
defendant to come out. (R. 146/ 70) The defendant then ran out of the bathroom, 
and officer Bamett yelled to the officers upstairs, "there's one running out." (R. 
146/ 72) The defendant tried to leave the house and pushed another officer, Officer 
Burnett on his way out. The two then got into a fight, and punches were thrown 
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each way. (R. 146/ 112) Officer Burnett identified himself as a police officer and 
told the defendant to "chill out". (R. 146/ 113) Agent Jensen got involved in the 
fight, and at some point, the defendant tried to take Agent Jensen's gun. (R. 146/ 
116, 154) Eventually a shot was fired and the defendant received a gunshot wound 
to the hand. (R. 146/ 119, 159) For purposes of this appeal the defendant submits 
that the testimony established the elements of the offense of disarming a police 
officer. After the State had called all their witnesses regarding the elements of 
the offense, they moved the trial court to allow the testimony of a witness Pat 
Vega. (R. 146/ 210) This witness was a police officer who arrived after the 
disarming occurred and then accompanied the defendant to the hospital. After 
arriving at the hospital, the witness called in to dispatch to check the record on the 
defendant and discovered that he had a warrant for an absconding charge. (R. 146/ 
223) The prosecutor then proceeded to put on evidence that the defendant was 
wanted on a warrant and that he was charged with absconding, and that he was on 
parole from the Utah State Prison. (R. 146/ 224) The prosecutor had originally 
moved the court to allow this testimony, and the defendant objected to the 
introduction of this testimony on the grounds that the prejudicial effect outweighed 
the probative value. (R. 146/ 210-219) The probative value the prosecutor allocated 
to this evidence was that it provided a motive for the defendant to run. (R. 146/ 
210) The trial court allowed this witness to testify concerning the fact that the 
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defendant was on parole from the prison, and that he was also wanted for 
absconding. (R. 146/ 223, 224) The trial court also, under the same ruling, allowed 
a stipulation to be presented to the jury that "there was a parole document from the 
Utah State Prison that [the defendant] was on parole at the time and that he was 
also a fugitive from his parole at that time." (R. 147/ 11) The jury then found the 
defendant guilty of the offense. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The determinative issue of the Defendant on appeal is whether the 
Defendant was illegally seized in violation of his 4 Amendment rights under the 
U.S. Constitution, and under Article 1 Section 12 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah. If this Court finds such a violation, then this Court would determine the 
collateral issues of whether the evidence obtained after the illegal seizure 
constitutes ' fruit of the poisonous tree" and finally whether the Defendant was 
deprived of his constitutional right to effective counsel. 
The evidence surrounding the seizure of the Defendant is uncontroverted. 
On August 25, 2000, members of the Weber/Morgan Narcotics Strike Force acting 
without a warrant, without probable cause, and without even reasonable suspicion 
followed up on an anonymous tip of marijuana sales at a home in Ogden. The 
officers decided to conduct a "knock-and-talk", where they approach a home, 
knock and see if the occupants will talk. The officers talked to some individuals 
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outside the home, and then asked if anyone else was still in the home. At that point 
someone said the Defendant was still in the home, and offered to go get him. The 
officer then made the first unconstitutional step when he stated that he would go in 
and find the Defendant. The officer then went into the house and ventured 
downstairs. He and some of the occupants of the house called the Defendant's 
name, and elicited no response. At that point, it was obvious to the officer that the 
Defendant, if he was in the home, did not desire to speak to the officer. The officer 
then took the second unconstitutional step when he proceeded to search the home, 
and finally located the Defendant hiding behind a door. The officer then identified 
himself as a police officer, and making the final unconstitutional act ordered the 
Defendant out of the bathroom. The Defendant then tried to leave, one of the 
officers who was still upstairs on the porch tackled him, and during the ensuing 
scuffle the testimony established that the Defendant attempted to take the police 
officers firearm. 
At no time, either before trial in a motion to suppress evidence, or during the 
course of trial did the Defendant's trial counsel ever raise an objection to these 
constitutional violations. The defense counsel's performance was so obviously 
deficient that the trial court should have stepped in and made some inquiry as to 
the constitutionality of the seizure. The entirety of the evidence of the Defendant's 
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offense occurred immediately after these violations, and therefore the issue of 
prejudice to the Defendant is also uncontroverted. 
The final issue to be decided by this court is whether timely objected to 
introduction of evidence concerning the fact that the Defendant was on parole and 
had absconded his parole was improper. These facts were allowed by the trial court 
under the theory that they established a motive for running. The prejudicial effect 
of this testimony far outweighed any probative value that the jury may have 
derived from this evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINTI 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF 
THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, 
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION WHEN HIS ATTORNEY FAILED TO MOVE 
THE COURT TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED AFTER 
AN ILLEGAL SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to counsel is 
the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 686, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court 
established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's assistance was 
ineffective. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel 
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was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. 
In the case of Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365 (1986) the Court was 
presented with a case where defense counsel, due to a failure to conduct proper 
discovery, did not timely file a motion to suppress evidence under the 4th 
Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction under an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. The Supreme Court affirmed that reversal. In that 
affirmation of reversal the Court stated: 
Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim 
competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the 
defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is 
meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict 
would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to 
demonstrate actual prejudice. {Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 
365, 375 (1986)) 
In making the determination that trial counsels conduct failed to comport with 
constitutional requirements the Court held: 
In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct pretrial 
discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only implausible 
explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while generally 
creditable enough, suggests no better explanation for this apparent and 
pervasive failure to "make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." 
[citation omitted] Under these circumstances, although the failure of 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals to examine counsel's 
overall performance was inadvisable, we think this omission did not 
affect the soundness of the conclusion both courts reached — that 
counsel's performance fell below the level of reasonable professional 
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assistance in the respects alleged. {Kimmelman v. Morrrison, Ml U.S. 
365,386(1986)) 
In the case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) the 
Court found that the failure of trial counsel to object to a 4th Amendment violation 
constituted error, as well as established reversible ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In that case, the Court applied the Strickland test to a situation where defense 
counsel had in a pretrial motion moved to suppress evidence on the basis of an 
illegal search. The trial court denied that motion based upon evidence at a 
preliminary hearing. During trial the officer altered his testimony establishing the 
lack of plain view, yet trial counsel did not re-raise the motion to suppress. The 
Court held that "where a defendant can show that there was no conceivable 
legitimate tactical basis for counsel's deficient actions, the first prong of Strickland 
is satisfied." (Id. at 976, quoting State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) 
Defense counsel's error in the present case was glaringly obvious to any 
observer. His -failure to object to and have a hearing on the seizure of the 
Defendant clearly showed a deficiency. In Kimmelman v. Morrison infra, the court 
found reversible error in a case where trial counsel realized a 4 Amendment issue, 
but brought it to the courts attention in an untimely manner. That untimely motion 
alone constituted reversible error. In State v. Gallegos infra, the court found error 
in trial counsel's failure to renew a previously denied motion to suppress. In the 
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present case, counsel, as in Kimmelman failed to make a timely motion to suppress 
a 4th Amendment violation. However, unlike counsel in Kimmelman or in 
Gallegos, trial counsel in the case at bar was so deficient that he never even 
recognized that a 4 Amendment question was at issue. 
Furthermore, "Counsel's performance at trial... suggests no better 
explanation for this apparent and pervasive failure." (Kimmelman) To the contrary, 
there is absolutely no conceivable reason for defense counsel not to make a pre-
trial motion to suppress this evidence. Since this motion should have been brought 
prior to trial, even the possible fear of somehow prejudicing the jury would be non-
existent. 
The second prong of the two-part test articulated in Strickland is "the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant 
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 
687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
In Strickland, the Court held that "[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to 
justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 
182 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that to meet the second part of the 
Strickland test a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 
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but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Id. at 187(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 694 (1984)). In making the determination that counsel was ineffective the 
appellate court should "consider the totality of the evidence, taking into account 
such factors as whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an 
isolated effect and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Id. 
Likewise, in the case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 981 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998), the court found prejudicial error in failing to object to the admission of a tin 
canister that contained drugs, which was found during an illegal search. In that 
case the court held: "Because the evidence found in the tin was essential to the 
State's case on [drug possession] charges, admission of that evidence was 
obviously prejudicial to defendant." 
In the present case, the error by defense counsel encompasses the "entire 
evidentiary picture". If trial counsel had raised the illegal seizure issue, and if the 
trial court had correctly ruled on that issue, all of the evidence obtained after such 
violation would have been suppressed. In this case, that means the entirety of the 
evidence that supported defendant's conviction. These claims will be more fully 
argued and supported in points II and III below. 
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When the totality of the circumstances is considered it is clear that the 
Defendant did not receive the type of assistance necessary to justify confidence in 
the outcome of the trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN 
FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD 
BEEN ILLEGALLY SEIZED BY THE POLICE. 
"To establish plain error, a defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact 
occur, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is 
harmful. State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348 (See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 
170, 174 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) In the case of State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 
(Utah App. 1994) this Court held "Under [the plain error] standard, we will not 
reverse unless we determine that an error existed, and that the error was both 
obvious and harmful". The Court further ruled "An error is harmful if the 
likelihood of a different result is 'sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the 
verdict.'" {Id at 1010) 
The first prong of the plain error test is showing that an error occurred. In 
the recent case of Kaupp v. Texas 02-5636 (U.S. 2003) the Supreme Court 
reiterates its long-standing position that the 4th Amendment prohibits seizures of a 
person from a home. In Kaupp the Court was presented with a situation where an 
officer who was investigating a murder went to the defendant's home, at night, and 
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after identifying himself, said "we need to go and talk". The defendant then said 
"OK" and the officer took him to the station for mirandized questioning. 
The Court, in reversing the defendant's conviction stated: 
A seizure of the person within the meaning of the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments occurs when "taking into account all the 
circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would 
'have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty 
to ignore the police presence and go about his business'". {Florida v. 
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 
486 U.S. 567,569(1988)) 
The Utah Court of Appeals in the case of State v. Burningham, 10 P.3d 355 
(Ut. Ct. App. 2000) reversed the conviction of a defendant who was seized and 
searched at a friend's cabin by a police officer acting without a warrant. This 
reversal was in spite of the fact that the defendant was on probation, and the officer 
was following up on a tip that the defendant was possessing illegal drugs. The 
Court held: "Thus, the search - supported only by reasonable suspicion - violated 
the appellant's Fourth Amendment rights." (Id at 357) See also State v. 
Valenzuela, 37 P.3d 260 (Ut. Ct. App. 2001) Where the Court reversed a 
defendant's conviction where he was stopped in a public bank based upon a tip 
from an unknown informant that the defendant had committed a forgery. The 
defendant was arrested (level III) and a search revealed a controlled substance. The 
Court determined that a reasonable officer under the circumstances could not have 
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had reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant had committed an offense, 
therefore the seizure was unconstitutional. 
In the recent case of State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650, 661 (Utah 2002) the 
Utah Supreme Court defined once again its' long-standing position on permissible 
levels of searches. In Hansen, the Court defined these levels as follows: 
A level-one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is a 
consensual encounter wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to non-
coercive questioning by an officer. IdL Since the encounter is 
consensual, and the person is free to leave at any point, there is no 
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Royer, 460 
U.S. at 498-99 
A level-two encounter involves an investigative detention that is 
usually characterized as brief and non-intrusive. United States v. 
Evans, 937 F.2d 1534, 1537 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Werking, 915 
F.2d at 1407 (noting a level two encounter is an investigative 
detention or "Terry stop"). Although it is a Fourth Amendment 
seizure, probable cause is not required. Evans, 937 F.2d at 1537. 
Rather, when "specific and articulable facts and rational inferences . . . 
give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a 
crime,'1 an officer may initiate an investigative detention without 
consent. Werking, 915 F.2d at 1407. 
A level three encounter involves an arrest, which has been 
"characterized [as a] highly intrusive or lengthy detention [that] 
requires probable cause." Id. A level three encounter is also a Fourth 
Amendment seizure. Id. 
In further defining when a stop crosses the line from level-one to level-two, 
the Court in the case of State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
stated: 
The distinction between a level-one encounter (a purely consensual 
encounter) and a level-two encounter (a seizure requiring reasonable 
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suspicion) depends on whether, through a show of physical force or 
authority, a person believes his freedom of movement is restrained. 
See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 
1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). 
In the case at bar, there is no question that the encounter with the Defendant 
in the home went beyond a level-one stop, since it occurred in the home, and the 
Defendant did not appear after a verbal request by the officer. The obviousness of 
this issue also establishes the second prong of the plain error test, that the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court. The testimony regarding the entry into 
the home and the seizure of the Defendant comprises a significant portion of the 
testimony at trial. The trial court therefore should have been cognizant of both this 
issue as well as the constitutional ramifications of that issue. 
The fact that this encounter was non-consensual is reinforced by the 
undisputed fact that after the officer found the Defendant and ordered him out, the 
Defendant tried to run. The encounter is therefore a level-two or level-three stop. 
A level-two stop requires reasonable suspicion, of which the facts undisputedly 
show was not established. The level-three stop requires probable cause, which by 
definition was also not present. This type of detention, in the home has never been 
permitted. 
Reasonable suspicion has been required in automobile or on the street 
seizures, which are less restrictive than in home seizures. In the case of Salt Lake 
City v. Ray, 998 P.2d 274 (Utah 2000) the Court reversed the conviction of a 
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defendant who was stopped and questioned by the police while standing outside a 
24-hour convenience store. In that case, the clerk of the store called the police to 
report that a lady had been standing outside the store for approximately two hours. 
After some initial questioning of the defendant, the officer asked for, and took, her 
identification card. The officer then received consent to search her bag and found 
some paraphernalia. The Court ruled: "This level one encounter escalated into a 
level two stop when [the officer] retained Ray's identification while running the 
warrant check." (Id. at 280) The Court found that the officer did not have 
reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant for a warrants check and ruled that the 
subsequent discovery of the paraphernalia was unconstitutional. 
The present case as argued above escalated into a level-two stop once the 
officer began searching the home, after verbal requests for the Defendant were 
ignored. The officers admittedly did not have reasonable suspicion that criminal 
activity was occurring at the home, or, more particularly that the Defendant was 
involved in any criminal activity. Officer Barnett testified "A lot of time, like I 
said, we get these complaints in our office and we don't have a way into the 
home". (R. 146/57) The officer then conducted a "knock-and-talk" to investigate 
these complaints. The officer then testified he conducted a "knock-and-talk" at the 
home because he did not "have any idea whether or not even the information [he] 
had was true." (R. 146/59) 
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The State may argue that the consent of the other occupants of the home 
somehow cured the illegality of the search. This line of reasoning cannot be 
supported. In the first place, there was no consent to search the home. The officer 
asked one of the individuals at the porch (Danny) if he "could go in and get [the 
defendant] out and [Danny] hesitated." (R. 146/66) The officers then threatened to 
get a search warrant and Danny offered to "go in and get him". (R. 146/66) The 
officer said "no, by all means you are not going in alone." (R. 146/66) The officer, 
without further comment by Danny then proceeded to go into the home and located 
the Defendant. 
Furthermore, even if the officer had consent by Danny to search the home 
for the Defendant, once the Defendant is seen and asked to come out, his refusal 
countermands any possible permission received from Danny. The stop has by this 
time escalated to a level-two or level-three stop for which at least reasonable 
suspicion is required. 
The State may argue that the Defendant did not have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy. In the case of State v. Bissegger 2003 UT App 256 f7 the 
Court examined the issue of expectation of privacy in stating: 
"[W]e employ a two-step test." [State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913,915 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992)]. First, we examine whether the defendant has 
demonstrated "a subjective expectation of privacy in the searched 
area." [State v. Scott, 860 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)] "An 
expectation of privacy is a question of intent, which may be inferred 
from words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts." State v. 
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Matison, 875 P.2d 584, 587-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quotations and 
citations omitted). Second, we determine whether the defendant's 
expectation was objectively reasonable — that is, "whether society is 
"willing to recognize the individual's expectation of privacy as 
legitimate.'" Id at 588 (quoting State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 565 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
In Bissegger the Court found a legitimate expectation of privacy in a lip-
balm container left in a car. If an expectation of privacy attaches to a lip-balm 
container left in a car, surely it attaches to an individual hiding in the bathroom of a 
home. In the present case, the Defendant's expectation of privacy "may be 
inferred from words spoken" or in this case silence, and by "acts done", such as 
hiding, and not coming out when called by his friends and the police. The second 
prong of the Sepulveda test, "whether the defendant's expectation was objectively 
reasonable" is obvious, as the Courts have long held that there is no place more 
protected than a home. 
The final prong of the plain error test is harm. The Court has held that "An 
error is harmful if the likelihood of a different result is 'sufficiently high to 
undermine confidence in the verdict.'" (the State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 
(Utah App. 1994) In the present case, the error by defense counsel encompasses 
the "entire evidentiary picture". {Strickland v. Washington infra.) If trial counsel 
had raised the illegal seizure issue, and if the trial court had correctly ruled on that 
issue, all of the evidence obtained after such violation would have been 
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suppressed. In this case, that means the entirety of the evidence that supported 
Defendant's conviction. 
POINTIII 
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED AFTER THE DEFENDANT WAS 
ILLEGALLY SEIZED CONSTITUTES FRUIT OF THE 
POISONOUS TREE AND THEREFORE SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN SUPPRESSED 
Once this Court has established that there was a constitutionally 
impermissible seizure of the Defendant, the next issue is to what extent does this 
constitutional violation effect the subsequent evidence. In the case of Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) the U.S. Supreme Court stated, "The 
exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials 
obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion." The Court 
further reinforced the gravity of 4 Amendment protections in the home by stating, 
In order to make effective the fundamental constitutional guarantees 
of sanctity of the home and inviolability of the person, Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, this Court held nearly half a century ago that 
evidence seized during an unlawful search could not constitute proof 
against the victim of the search. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383. 
The exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the 
direct products of such invasions. {Wong Sun v. United States, at 484) 
The Utah Courts have likewise followed the fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine. In the case of State v. Deherrera, 965 P.2d 501, 505 (Utah App. 1998) 
the Court held: 
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Absent an exception to the exclusionary rule, Mapp requires us to 
exclude "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of 
the Constitution." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655, 81 S.Ct at 1691. There is 
no dispute that the stop of defendant at the Tibbie Fork Canyon traffic 
checkpoint was unconstitutional. Nor is there any dispute that, absent 
the good faith exception, all evidence obtained subsequent to 
defendant's stop should be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 
9L.Ed.2d441(1963). 
In the present case the prosecutor put on evidence that the Defendant was on 
parole from prison, and that he was wanted for absconding. (R. 146/ 223, 224 and 
147/ 11) The prosecutor, recognizing the problems this evidence entailed actually 
moved the trial court prior to calling Officer Vega for a ruling on this evidence. 
The defense objected to the evidence under a Rule 403 theory. The court ruled that 
the evidence would come in, under Rule 404(b) that it provided motive for the 
defendants actions in running from the police. The problem with this argument is 
twofold. First, running from the police is not an element of the offense of 
disarming a police officer1. Second, it was evidence in anticipation of a defense the 
defendant might put on in its case, which was premature. Even though the 
defendant may, and in this case did put on evidence regarding an explanation for 
1
 The elements of this offense as described to the jury by the trial court are (1) That 
said defendant, Corey B. Maisey; (2) Intentionally; (3) Took or removed, or 
attempted to take or remove, a firearm; (4) from the person or immediate presence 
of a person he knew was a peace officer, N. Jensen; (5) Without the consent of the 
peace officer and while the peace officer was acting within the scope of his 
authority as a peace officer. 
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the Defendant running, the defense was forced to put on this evidence by the 
prosecutor's untimely testimony of Officer Vega. 
Further, the prosecutor's elicitation of this testimony was a thinly veiled 
attempt to introduce evidence that it knew would be highly prejudicial to the 
Defendant. (R. 146/ 212) The prosecutor so much as acknowledges the irrelevance 
of this evidence in arguing that there were other possible motives (illegal drugs and 
illegal pornography) for the Defendant running, but he only wants to put on 
evidence of his parole and absconding status. (R. 146/ 218) The prosecutor, time 
and again during closing arguments, referred to the Defendant's parole status (R. 
147/ 115, 117, 121, 145) with the effect of prejudicing the Defendant at each 
reference. 
POINTIV 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
RULING TO ADMIT TESTIMONY OF THE DEFENDANT'S 
PRISON RECORD AND PAROLE STATUS? 
During the first day of trial, on April 9 2001, after the State had put on 
most of it's fact witnesses, the prosecutor made a motion to allow the testimony of 
an Officer Pat Vega who would testify that after the incident, and after the 
Defendant was transported to the hospital, he ran a records check and discovered 
that the Defendant was on parole, that he had absconded parole and that a warrant 
for his arrest had been issued for a parole violation. (R. 146/ 210-219) The court, 
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among other things addressed the issue of whether or not testimony concerning the 
Defendant's prison record and his parole status would be admissible in trial. The 
State, over the Defendant's objection, requested the admission of this information 
under a theory that it was necessary to establish motive for the Defendant's attempt 
to run from the home after discovery. The prosecutor acknowledged that there was 
an obvious objection to this evidence. (R. 146/ 210) The prosecutor asked that the 
Court allow this evidence under Rule 404(b) to establish "motive as to the 
reasoning behind his running and his actions because he knew he was on probation 
and parole at the time". (R. 146/ 210) The trial court then ruled that this evidence 
would be admissible (R. 146/ 218, 219). Thereafter, the prosecutor had Officer 
Vega testify to these issues without further objection. In the case of State v. 
Dominguez, 2003 UT App 158 ^18 the Court of Appeals ruled that: 
Defendant was not required to object during trial to evidence offered 
in accordance with the court's pretrial ruling. Utah Rule of Evidence 
103 states, "Once the court makes a definitive ruling on the record 
admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need 
not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error 
for appeal," 
In making it's motion to allow the evidence of the defendant's prison and 
parole record, the prosecutor relied on Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
which provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
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proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In other worlds, evidence 
offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character 
purpose and meets the requirements of 402 and 403. 
The Supreme Court has struggled with the rule of other crime evidence 
under Rule 404(b) in recent years. The Court in 1997 issued the opinion of State v. 
Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997) and then in 1999 issued the opinion of State v. 
Decorso, 993 P.2d 837 (Utah 1999) in which they reassessed and to some extent 
overruled Doporto. 
In the case of State v. Decorso, the Court held "admission of prior crimes 
evidence itself must be scrupulously examined by trial judges in the proper 
exercise of that discretion." (Id at 843) The court then described the required two-
pronged analysis the trial court must utilize in making a ruling on this issue. First, 
the trial court must determine whether the evidence is being offered for a proper 
noncharacter purpose. Second, the trial court must determine whether the evidence 
tends to prove some fact material to the crime charged, and whether its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. (Id at 843,844). 
In Decorso, the Court gave some direction on establishing probative value 
as follows: 
In deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice and the like 
substantially outweighs the incremental probative value, a variety of 
matters must be considered, including the strength of the evidence as 
to the commission of the other crime, the similarities between the 
crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the 
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need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree 
to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering 
hostility. {State v. Decorso at 845) 
In the present case, the trial court found that the proposed evidence 
established motive for the Defendant's running. The trial court further found that 
the probative value substantially outweighed the prejudicial effect of the evidence. 
(R. 146/ 216) The problem that the trial court failed to recognize is that running is 
not an element of the offense. In fact, the trial court in its instructions to the jury 
listed the elements of the offense as follows: "The elements of this offense as 
described to the jury by the trial court are (1) That said defendant, Corey B. 
Maisey; (2) Intentionally; (3) Took or removed, or attempted to take or remove, a 
firearm; (4) from the person or immediate presence of a person he knew was a 
peace officer, N. Jensen; (5) Without the consent of the peace officer and while the 
peace officer was acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer." (R. 
100) 
The first prong of the Decorso test is therefore inadequately established. The 
fact that the Defendant ran, when confronted by the police does not tend to 
establish or even explain any element of the offense. This evidence was in fact 
discovered significantly after the incident had occurred, and while the Defendant 
was in the hospital being treated for his gunshot wound. Neither was there any 
evidence that the prior conviction (i.e. parole) was similar to the crime charged, 
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nor was any evidence put on about time frame. The only purpose for that evidence 
relayed to the trial court was to establish motive for running. 
It is important to note that explaining why an individual would run does not 
constitute motive. Motive, as defined by Ballentine's Law Dictionary (Third 
edition) is "The power which impels to action for a definite result; that which leads 
or tempts the mind to indulge in a criminal act." In the present case, the criminal 
act is the disarming of the police officer. The prosecution asked, and the trial court 
allowed the evidence of motive for the act of running. That act is not criminal, nor 
is it an element of the criminal act of disarming a police officer. 
An analysis of the evidence in the case at bar would show that first, the 
purported evidence of motive for running is not relevant under a Rule 402 analysis, 
since the motive attempted to be proved must be at least tangentially related to an 
element of the offense. If this Court were to rule differently, such a ruling would 
allow any evidence of prior bad acts to come in under a motive reasoning, 
effectively destroying Rules 402, 403, and 404. In this case, the fact that the 
Defendant had motive to run from the police does not substantially help prove any 
of the five elements of the offense. 
Even if this Court determines that foundation falls within the parameters of 
"motive", there still exists the problem that the record is devoid of anything but the 
most cursory analysis under Rule 403 of the prejudicial effect that this evidence 
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would have on the defendant in the minds of the jury'. (R. 146/214) Such an 
analysis is required both under Rule 404(b) as well as by State v. Decorso and its 
progeny.3 The trial court, at a minimum, must make a finding as to the extent of 
the prejudicial effect, and how that prejudice is substantially outweighed by the 
probative value. A simple conclusory statement does not comport with either Rule 
403 or the Decorso test. 
If this Court finds that the trial court committed error in its ruling on the 
admissibility of this evidence, the court must then determine whether or not that 
error was harmful. The trial court has already made some finding on that issue by 
stating, "I acknowledge the prejudice that it shows..." (R. 146/214). The 
prosecutor also, by bringing the matter to the trial court's attention, prior to any 
objection by defense counsel likewise acknowledged the prejudicial effect this 
evidence may have on the defendant. In the case of State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 
920, (Utah 1987) the court held, "For an error to require reversal, the likelihood of 
a different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the 
verdict." 
2
 The trial court simply stated "I acknowledge the prejudice that it shows, but the 
probative value is not substantially outweighed by the prejudice." (R. 146/214) 
3
 See also State v.Colwell 994 P.2d 177 (Utah 2000) where the Prosecution 
committed error in inquiring into the particulars of the defendants previous 
convictions which were divulged in his direct examination. 
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In the present case, the evidence that the Defendant was on parole, had 
absconded and had a warrant from the prison was extremely damaging. Absent 
that evidence, the jury may have believed that the Defendant was first attacked by 
the police officer who was not "acting within his scope of authority as a police 
officer" as proposed by defense counsel. A finding of this defense by the jury, of 
course would have resulted in a not guilty verdict, thus establishing the second 
prong of the Decorso test. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests this court 
reverse the Defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial. 
DATED this ~Y_ day of August, 2003. 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Before you can convict the defendant of disarming a peace officer, a first degree felony, 
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Jensen; 
(5) Without the consent of the peace officer and while the peace officer was acting 
within the scope of his authority as a peace officer. 
If you find from the evidence all of the elements defined above beyond a reasonable doubt, 
then you must find the defendant guilty of disarming a peace officer, a first degree felony. If, 
however, you are unable to find one or more of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 





(The jury exits the courtroom.) 
MR. WESTMORELAND: Your Honor, the next witness that 
the state would call part of his testimony would be the fact 
that he called in to dispatch and found that there was a 
warrant out for the defendant, that he was on parole with 
Adult Probation and Parole and was a fugitive at that time. 
Obviously the defense is going to object to that evidence 
coming in. The state believes that that falls under .404 B 
under motive as to the reasoning behind his running and his 
actions because he knew that he was on probation and parole 
at the time, and that as a result of that, that would explain 
or give him at least motive and knowledge at that time. 
Because if this were a drug dealer or somebody else that was 
coming to get him, there would be no reason for him to run 
like that. 
The fact that he was on parole at the time would suggest 
or at least give him motive and knowledge and that falls 
under the exception under 404 B to allow that evidence in. 
And is not more prejudicial than probative. It does go to 
the state's case and would show the reasoning behind it and 
the reason that he was acting the way that he did. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: We obviously object to that, your 
Honor. Our contention is that that is more prejudicial than 
probative to have the jury know that he was — to have the 
jury know that he was on parole. Certainly the state is free 
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to make whatever argument they want to at the end of the 
case. Obviously we're going to argue something differently. 
The state's contention at this point is that his motive 
for running couldn't have been provided by any other persons 
of the drug culture coming to the home. We actually intend 
to produce evidence that that, in fact, was a possible 
motive. But we would submit to the Court that the evidence 
that he was on parole is irrelevant, it's highly prejudicial 
and is does not — however the rule states it — that it's 
more prejudicial than probative. 
THE COURT: Of course the rule, it's not just 
whether it's one or the other. Rule 403 says, "Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of issues." 
And so the question is not just which way does it tip, 
but all evidence is presumed to be relevant. And it's only 
excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice. Tell me again why you 
feel, Mr. Westmoreland, why it's important that they 
understand that he was on parole. 
MR. WESTMORELAND: Your Honor, if they understand he 
was on parole and knowing what parole is — they don't need 
to know the reason he was on parole, what he had done prison 
time for prior to that. Simply the fact that he was on 
Zl-L^. 
parole and that he was a fugitive at the time, that would be 
the testimony, that he was a fugitive, and knowing that these 
are police officers, at least our evidence is they identified 
themselves as police officers, knowing that he's fugitive and 
that he very likely could be taken into custody again because 
he is a fugitive, that goes directly to what we're trying to 
prove to give other reasons for why he was running. 
We understand what the defense's point is going to be and 
this is extremely relevant. It does not — is not 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial nature. This is 
not prejudicial that it shows other crimes or something. It 
simply shows that he was a fugitive and that he was afraid of 
the police officers because he did not want to be taken into 
custody again. Then it goes through and explains exactly — 
or it shows at least it gives us an argument and gives them a 
rational reason to see what his — why his behavior was the 
way it was. 
THE COURT: See — go ahead and respond, then I'll 
ask you a question. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Well, I suppose basically this comes 
down to a dispute in the evidence. Even the state's own 
witnesses some of them indicate that they were not clear as 
to whether other officers identified themselves to the 
defendant. 
I think what's really relevant at this point is that at 
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the point the defendant began to run, did he know. And we 
anticipate producing evidence from Danny Winder who was — 
the testimony shows was with Officer Barnett at the time that 
the defendant was located in the bathroom and ran. I 
anticipate that Mr. Winder will testify that the officer did 
not identify himself as an officer at that point. So it 
comes down to a he said/he said kind of thing. And under 
those circumstances, what the jury is going to have to is 
weigh the credibility of the officer's testimony against the 
credibility of the other witnesses1 testimony, we end up 
clouding the issue with something that clearly is 
prejudicial. The question is how much how much prejudice 
does it carry to something that is clearly prejudicial and 
saying oh, by the way, this guy was on parole and he was a 
fugitive. 
It's difficult enough — for the defendant in any 
criminal case has a tough enough time by sitting here at the 
defense table being in charged with a crime. And itfs 
difficult enough to try to convince a jury that they need to 
believe these citizen witnesses over police officer 
witnesses, because we all know no matter we say under the law 
and the Constitution, we all know that people generally 
believe police officers over citizens. So that battle alone 
is quite enough for the defendant without binding him with 
this clearly prejudicial evidence that he was on parole at 
1 the time. I mean, the evidence I think is going to be clear 
2 from all witnesses who were there that the defendant ran and 
3 that there was a struggle with police. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. But the jury then has to hear 
5 well, why would he run, why would he struggle. I mean, most 
6 of us would just submit. What was it that motivated him to 
7 want to contend with a police officer and get away? 
8 Ifm going to deny — or grant your motion and deny your 
9 objection, Mr. Bouwhuis, because I think that it does go to 
10 show motive to run and why he wanted to get away and why he 
11 would contest. Because most people would not — that's not 
12 the normal behavior of most of us. Most of us would submit 
13 if we had nothing to hide and it explains why he was so 
14 aggressive with the officer, and so I think that it is 
15 probative in that way. I acknowledge the prejudice that it 
16 shows, but that probative value is not substantially 
17 outweighed by the prejudice. 
18 MR. BOUWHUIS: For the record, can I just interject 
19 something, your Honor? This is not — as far as I can recall 
20 this has not come out yet in any of the witnesses the state 
21 has presented. But there is one witness Ifm aware of who the 
22 state has who does have this information in his possession, 
23 and that is after this incident was all over with and the 
24 scene was secured, the police went into search the home, in 
25 the area where Corey Maisey was they found a wallet with his 
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identification and drugs. And in fact, we put this on the 
record earlier, the state intends to file the charge based on 
the possession of drugs there and that — the record would 
reflect that that is not a stretch to say that he wanted to 
get away because he knew that there were drugs in the 
bathroom and that they could be tied to him and that could 
provide another motivation for him to run. And I don't think 
the state — as far as the factual representation I think the 
state would agree. 
THE COURT: But is there evidence that the state has 
right now that there's been a testing of those drugs and they 
know what it is, can they really show that it was his as 
opposed to somebody else's in the home? 
MR. WESTMORELAND: Well, we don't have any — just 
for the record, we don't have any intent of.putting that 
evidence on. That's another case for another day. All we're 
worried about to — I mean, if the defense wants to bring 
that up, that's great. You know, we'll bring in rebuttal 
witnesses to take care of that issue. But we don't intend on 
putting that issue on at all. 
THE COURT: The concern that I have with that, 
Mr. Bouwhuis, and I appreciate your advocacy, but I think 
that we do then is we create another case within this case. 
We create a drug case within this case, which I think also 
has great prejudice toward the defendant. We then have to 
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put on a chain of evidence to show that he had knowledge the 
drugs were his, you know, the testing of the drugs and I 
think that takes up a lot time. And I think that just the 
fact that he maybe was on parole is clean and I think it 
explains motive and that's what the state wants. And I'm 
finding that the probative value of that evidence is not 
substantially outweighed — or excuse me, that the unfair 
prejudice does not substantially outweigh the probative 
value. I think it is probative. I think it explains motive, 
I will limit the state, however, in that they are not to 
testify as to what the charge was or the conviction unless 
the defendant feels that at that point based on my ruling 
that it would be probably in his advantage to have that on 
because it might — rather than have him — rather than have 
the jury speculate about something very serious, it might be 
more minimal. I don't know what he's on parole for. I'll 
leave that up to your judgment. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Let me just real briefly just so the 
record reflects this. On the issue that the Court 
mentioned — and I accept the Court's ruling on the issue. 
But the Court stated that we would create a case within a 
case trying to show a connection with the drugs and the 
testing and all of that, but I think the real issue goes to 
his motive of running and that wouldn't have to do with 
whether the stuff was tested but whether or not he believed 
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at that time he was getting caught with drugs, not whether 
they actually ended up being tested as drugs. What it all 
goes to is what his state of mind was at the time and I just 
wanted the record to reflect that. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Let me think about that for just 
a moment. Do you want to respond? 
MR. WESTMORELAND: Well, your Honor, if that's — I 
mean, if defense counsel wants us to put on a case that we 
believe there were drugs down there and that he was the owner 
of those drugs and is not going to make us put on a chain of 
evidence to suggestion that, yes, it actually was 
methamphetamine, that's fine. I mean, I think all that does 
is bolster our case more than anything. 
If he wants to put on an alternative theory saying that 
there were drugs down there, et cetera, he was running 
because of drugs, that's fine. But I don't see how that has 
anything to do with his parole status and the reason he runs. 
He could put on as many alternative theories for running as 
we wants. But again, I don't think that precludes us from 
putting on the issue that we want to deal with in the fact 
that he was on parole. We could put that evidence on, that's 
fine. But again, I'm not sure that that necessarily helps 
the defense's case. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: If I may, your Honor, I don't know if 
we're both just advocating our causes here. But it almost 
zxo 
sounds like the defendant is being put in a catch-22; choose 
the lesser of two evils, you can either tell the jury that 
you were on parole or you can tell the jury that you were 
using drugs. All we're saying is we don't want the jury to 
be told that he was on parole. We're not saying, Judge, we 
want to give you a choice; the drugs or parole. 
MR. WESTMORELAND: But the drugs have nothing to do 
with his parole status. The jury never has to hear nor are 
they prejudiced if they don't hear the fact that there are 
drugs down there. I mean, if that's the case, there's 
pornography down there which is illegal, there's a whole lot 
of other things down there that are illegal, but that does 
not vitiate the fact that he was on parole and that that goes 
to motive for his running. 
THE DEFENDANT: Running because of fear. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Of course running is not the crime, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'm going to grant — or not — I'm 
going to allow it to come in. Let me say this: If you want, 
Mr. Bouwhuis, I will give a cautionary instruction. I 
will — I'm willing to give an instruction that their focus 
is not to be on the issue that he is on parole, that it is to 
be considered only as an explanation of why he might be 
running and it's not to be considered for any other purpose, 
and particularly, they are not to consider it as proving in 
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any way his character in this case. And if you would like an 
instruction to that extent, sort of a cautionary instruction, 
I'm willing to do that, 
MR. WESTMORELAND: Judge, we would request that 
instruction, in fact. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Yeah. I agree with that. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
MR. WESTMORELAND: Can we have a few minutes recess 
your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. I need a few minutes as well. 
(A recess was taken.) 
(The jury enters the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: You may proceed, Mr. Westmoreland. 
MR. WESTMORELAND: The state calls Officer Pat Vega. 
EAT VEGA, 
having been duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATICN 
BY MR. WESTMDREIAND: 
Q. Please tell us your name and spell your last name. 
A. Patrick Vega, V-E-G-A. 
Q. What is your occupation? 
A. Police officer with South Ogden police. 
Q. How long have you been with South Ogden? 
A. Four years. 
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